Mimirrisii.). Although the Buddhist University ot'N~landa was still flourishing and there were skilled Buddhist d'alecticians arou.nd, certain. other factqrs. possibly internal to the Buddhist community, are said lO have contributed to the gradual decline of Buddhism after Nagarjuna·s palmy days (c. 150 C.E.).
1
The Mirniilllsakas appealed to moral arg1.1ments in order to disc::redit the credibility of Buddhism. Was it, however, necessary for the Mlln~saka.s to rcolaim the territory of Hindu Dharma or ""Law" with asserfions or argumerits in favor of belief in Ood? It seemed not. What c-on~ernc:d them most was 'hat the Vedic culture had been eclipsed.
Kllmlrila Bhana was perhaps the foremost among the Mima()lsa revivalists during this period. He lived in the seventh century (some say 590-650 C.E.; others 600-700 C.E.)" and was pl,'Obably a contcmporar-y of the &rcat 8uddhist dialcc:tieian Dh.atmakirti.
While defending the orthodoxy of the MimiifJlsa. Kumarila was moved to complain that the MTmarpsa had, by and. large, come to be looked upon as a ··heretical'f system. To the question "How so?" Kumarila replied that the:
Mimi[J'lsa had been reduced ro the stat11s of Lokayata, or Carvaka-dar.fana. the syst~m of natutalistlc materialism with its patently. hedonistic ethic.~ Kumarila wanted to resist the incipient tendency to associate the MTmiqlsa with some form of debased belief in a ''this-worldly'" rcali1y, and hence to reject identification of the prevatent materialist .. naturaJistic system(s) with the school he led. Should this, howevet, be taken to mean that Kumirila wanted to assert or reassert belief in an "olh.c:r~worldlyn reality, such as a supra-natural order or a supremely transcendent being? No. It seem.s that his only concern was lhat the V~a should not be maligned with some ton'Upt form of' naturalism that bordered on materialism and hedonism. {Pcthaps he would have been less concerned had Mim~saka he.en called t·a realist who s.wears by the Veda"!). tn ord~r to rega\n orthodoxy for Mimilflsi, KumArUa had to elevate the status of the Veda (iastras) and make its authority unassailable.
There were two possible ways of rescuing the orthodoxy claimed by the Mirnaf!\Sa: (a) by attributing the source of the Veda to a supreme divine being, whose very omniscience and omnipotenee would sanction the authority of the 1 Gopiaalh Kavita,i, Preface !o Gangamllha Jha's trnn!Sla.cjon or l(unu!.rila BhaUa's Ta"rraWJmika.
Biblio1h~ca lndica 161 (Cah:uua; Asit1t~ Soi::iMy or B1!:11g,al, 1903 .. 192") : reprinted Sri Garib ~ Oriental Series N~. 9, 10 (DcllT!; S~r.sgufti ftublic:ations, 1983). vol. p. vii: Bd !.eto Umcsha Mitra, ia At11li:ndu ~o Oa.npn::uha Jha, Pdrva. Mi~&lflSl in lt5 S~ur~s (Varnna1i; Ba""te; tUridu Univ .• 1964) . pp. [21] [22] SlokavtJt'ft{f(a (tarlrapada) , IJ. # 10 (ct. Jha's tn.nslatioo, p. 2-acc note 9 below).
-Cr. Oangiinntha. Jha translatio11s of "lolc.dyata•• "" ••;i.tb11i1:1n,'' :il1d "ii.r1ika" aa "ll'lti!ltie.'' Thi:. b p~tcntly miiih::"idin-g, panicularly in the c:t. Centuries tatc:r, Cangeta (1300-1400 C.E.), the founder of the Navya-nyiya or .. new logic .. school. took up the simple il'lference (ksityiidi sakli.rcrkatri karyati,..at ghaJavot), unp9.cked it into its (fc.ur) Gonstituten.ts parts, eonsidered and examined its possible reronnulations, and wove an extrem,:ly sophist~cated defense of the inferenc:e, answering all possible. objc:ccioris raised against the:. validity Qf the inferential process involv~. He offered his own formula.lion based on a contplex reasoning by parity and conducted in favor of the i:xisti::nce ofOodt theomaiscient Being who knows and directs thi: beginningless ftux. of .atom.$, dyadst triads, and the: .. unsce:n etfectuaHty'" (adr~/a). a.nd who through his all-extensive desire creates the world. •J Basic:aUy. what the Nyiya position ar,gues is that '"beins-an~effect~ .. as in the case of pots, extends to the wofld as well; that .. havlng·an·agcnt" likewise applies to both, since it clearly is the case with (the) pot; and to staci:: otherwise would bt: contradictory. 14 But God. in this view, doi:s not have to produce through his bodily activity or agenc:y caeh and every particular thing, not does God havr: to promulgate every effecl that we see and experience in the world. It follows that Ood does not have: to possess knowlcdgi: of the particulars or be the direct cause of their e:rd.stence. God is the format and universaf efficient cause (invoking lhc.
rule that the c.au.se of the universal is the universal}, a.tad there are other finite efficient and material causes that bring abo..tt tbe particular thing:3 and events as there are in the world. Thus God depends, in part, on human effott to create the world. In orhcr words 1 God 'knows the ~otiv~ and g¢neral principles involved in the production of things in the world, but He does not .acru~Uy involve Hirns;elf in the process: He has, as it were~ a remote telic and instrumental control over the world.
God indeed works in mystc:rious ways. In the final analysis, however. the God of Nyaya~ since He does not create the world e~ nihilo, or out of His own body as a spider spins a web from its bowels. is redoced to something like the deroiurge oC Plato, who a~ architc~t forms the world out of a prc..exisling set of conditions zi.rtd substance (vi2.., by ci1Jusing the atoms to come foto mutual contact), maintains a continuous rclation!lhip wi\h the universe as its preserver, and dissolves the world when conditions requjre it to be dissolved. This is as far as the cosmogonic necessity of God caa be taken. known in form (SV s#~8}? Presumably, we are speaking of something far beyond the scale of opennion involved in the pottet' rnaking his pot, the clockmaker his clock, or ahe spider spinning a web from withi111 its body, or even the 11eom generating lhe oak trc~-" A\ this point, something like the Humean crunch comes in as Kumirila concludes!. "There the theory of Creation and nissolution must be admi\.ted io rcs~mble the every·day process~s (of production ;and de.struction); and any particular id~ of 'hesc: with regard to the production and destruction of 1.be whole universe cannot be established. for want of proofs" (SV i;;-#113). The rea5oning here is that a mere logical possibility does not eslabJish a necessity with any certainty.
We are here reminded of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and the doubts that he expre.ues 1hrOUJlb Philo in takins ··operations or one part of nature upon another for the fouridation or ow-judgement conceT'J1ing the origin of the whole {which 'never can be ad1t1iucd). " 1 • TIJat is to say, the doubt is with regard to takinc empirical insaani;:es. such as a clockmaker making a clock or the oraanic processes of pla.nts and animals, as modeJs for the principles governing ihe pJanets and the univcne at large. We have not witnessed another universe being created, as we see c1od:makers making clocks, poners creating pots, etc.~ thus no parallels e-an be dl'awn here-And from limited col'\iunctions in our relative field of ex.peric:ncc., we cannot go on to generalize about the process or origin of the order and structure or the uni'l'erS4': as a whole. The a.naJogie:s and reasoning the Nyaya has advanced, while they may be suggestive of a Jogical possibiliry. provide only weak justification? and in thcmselvc$.. Kumarila argues, lack the force to convince one ihat such is neccs$ar.i1y the: ease. namely. that the universe as a whole has a cause. There is, bowcvc:r. apas-t from thr:: appeal to causaHty, another reason that some Nruyayikas found persuasi,,e for inferring tile guiding band of God. This amounts to a moral argument, namely. the "ecessity to account for the dispensation of the fniits of actions, which result ftom peoplc"s ptevious merhs and de.merits. Unless there wer~ an aJl .. knowing divine and intelligent agent, how could we conceive this [O be possibte? Surely, as we have just remarked, the Nyaya believes that actions create the unseen effectua\ity (adu!u.) Some Naiyiyikas respond by suQg;csting that God mcTeJy crcares the auxiliary causes by which individual dispensations take place, so that God does not have to attend to a.nd deal with each ~d every individual action or t.he unseen. Or, as Newton might have said, Cod does not mQve His ••hidden hand'' ot directly intervene each time an apflle: falls; the law of gt"avity, which God built into the universe, tak~ care of lhat. Presumably, the Naiyiyikas michl concede that there is an autonomous and inexorable operation of the law of karma; they are, however~ also quick to poinl gut 1hat Goo is both above merits and demerits (dharma~adhDTma) and that the law of karma is subordinate to GOO. That is to say, it is only when God activates the merits and demerits of the individual souls that the just reward to each soul is meted out.
The standard M9'11\13.fl\Si rebuttal of the last position is that if a soul cannot direct its own merJt and demerit .. neither can God, who is simply another soul (in the Nyiya view), do it. KumArila also doubts that God ~an ••per~eive" merits and demerits and that He has any co11.tact with bodies in which these are located. Kumarjla rules that it is unparshnonious to postulate an agency beyond the .. unseen'' ro a~coun1 for the dispi:nsation or rewards~ etc. Furthermore, it is possible to explain that [be world itself comes about as a. result of thr;: meritorious and the unmeritorious deeds of the eternalJy exisring individual souls. Actions af people J)rocl:ucc apurva, al\d it is this unseen potency that is effective in bringing a.bout things through which the fmits arc enjoyed. etc. This aspect of the cosmogony is not dC\'eloped by KumarUa, although tbhi appea.r.i to be the accept~d account of the J\lli.mamsa's doctrine of ucontinuous creationism" (namely. that the pt0posed theory must be: i:onsistent with the everyday processes of becoming and disappearint1 cf. #113. cited earlier). Kumirila reinforces this by remarking that "we could onfy admit of" a gradual process of creation1 such as we see in the case: of present living beings (creating the jar. etc.). ":ti 3. The Problem of "Evil" 10 diminish the N'yaya moral argument fol" Ocd''i l"ole in the crcatiOr'l of rhe universe, Kumari1a. once again invokes the pcrcnniill uproblem of evil" aad takes it a. seep furthr;r in order to disetedit the existence or the .supposed (benevolent) Perhaps what this shows is the Mim~sa.·~ reluctance ta take seriously analogical thinking, wbatevi=.t it:s limitations, and to c.onsidcr how we might begin 10
.understand that wbkh extends beyond ordinary human experience. The MimiJ11-saka was undoubtedly a stickler for not going beyond the immediately given. and in some ways was more positivist than the modern-day positivists. The irony, though. is that the Mjm~sa had no qualms about accepting the .idea of apurva or 1.hC ··unseen potency,'' attrfbutcd as it is to human action. and which seems to work with the same degree of automation as docs the complex system of switches · and si.gnals used for controlling the operation of space shutdes-._ The .reality of :rvarga. the heaven.Jilte ••kingdom of endst" is another of Mimamsi's commitments. as aJso i$ the belief in the eternity and plurality of individulll souls. Surely, on such maners~ •he Mimams! displays a distini:t oon-nsturalistic tendency •nd appears 10 rest its faith on what goes be}'ond the pcrci::ptible~ In themselves, however, these '"imperceptibJes'' arc not \he elass, of ••trancendcntals" as any standard theistic system wauld wish to suppose. The ''world beyond,·~ or 1hc "othcr·worldJy'' reality •. is not :1omcihing remov~d from the bounds of hu:rnan Tea1ity. Even the gods or deities w~o are invoked in ritual sacrifices as ... wit-14 SV ~1"5113 and ~ommc-nu1ry (p, l$7).
DJ bid,
ncsses'' to human offering~ do not fulfil! the ru~ction that Ood fulfill:; in, for ins[ance, the Nyaya view. 4. Evidenc.e in the Veda Could scripture be the grounds for establishing the existenci: of God the Creator? Some, especially the Na.iyayikas and the Vcdintins like R!unfi.nuja (Sribhd,rya on BS I i 3), argue that the assertion about God's creation is to be read in the Veda itself. The scripture further speaks in one voice of the creation ofth~ world and the Veda. Inde~d. ,.fl.g Veda X.90.9 appears lo speak of the Veda as having originated from the Primordial ... Man•• (Puru;a) in a cosmic sacrifice orchestrated by the gods. The Upan.i1ads, notably thi; Mut1<iaka Ul. l.4), speak of rbc Veda. as having cma~ated from BrahmM. Again, the Brdho.ma~as attn'"bute the emergence of the Veda to the gods. namely, Agni (Fire)t Vdyu (Wind). Adicya (Sun). Els~where, Brahma." is d=scribed as having .. breathed forth" (n.i(iivasita) the Veda (Brhadtirottyaka Upo.nisad ll.4.10, IV.S.U}. Most impfcssiitely, the isa (l.i) and SvetaJvatara (Vl.18) Upani1ads speak of the pervasiveness or the. Supreme Lord. who gave the Vcd.a to Brahma (himself lookc.d upon as the ucrr:ator•' aspect of God).
The Mimamsaka, again, dismissc:s such cla.lins with more than a touch of cynicism, for he considers the passages to be unrellable. Rather, these ate to be: interpreted metaphorically because they fall undc:r the category of artha...,adas or auxiliary statements, whose explicit purport is to eulogize and praise the: central theme of the primary ritual text (vidhi.s . What if the scripture. wss cre.ated with the universe? KumiiriJa mishr reply that this i' an instance of yet :another mylh-making st.ory intended to-distra.ct the believers and detrac1ars alike.
God. then 1 on the accounts considered above, does not appear lo the MTma:IJlSi to be l.\ very useful postulate. fot c)C.plaining the .;re.a.ti.on of the world and the workings of the destiny of each human being. p.;ople 1 s action rbroiigh the insirumentality of the apurva is respons,bJ~ for the coming~into-bcing of the world, and SQ there t5 no need to suppose thi:lt this process has to be controUcd and regulated by any supernatural (persooal) agency. Rather, the laws of action~ rcuibution. of sacrifice-result, of duty-n:ward etc., operate, as ir were., autornati .. c:aUy t 8Utonomous1y, and inexorably, as do the so<alled laws of nature identified m the sciences; and they do not stand in need of a regulative inte.tligent principle as implied in. any postulation about a creator Ood.
s. The Argument from Scripture
Another va.riatiQn of the argument from sc:ripture which Kum!rila examines is the Nyaya attempt to argue for the existence of God on the _grounds of the authority and sanctity of the Veda in respect to its pronouncem11:.nts on Dharm.a (''La~.n}. whic:b Nylya readily acc~p.t.s as an independent moral c;oncept. 1he Ny~ya rti.tionalis1s championed the following argument; the remarkable authoritative and trustworthy c:haractcristics of the Veda, as wen as its internal structure, !':us.gest a transcendental source of superior eminence, who alone is. capaole of such insights and ethical rectitude in His conccm for sou't'ld human ac:tion and welfare. It is inconceivable, contended these rationali~ts (and as Udaya.na, c. 90t)... J200 C.E.~ later fonnaliicdn), that any being other than one wbo is tJmniscieot :and most benevolent w~mld ltave been moved to "reveal" to an ignorant human l'aee su<::h eievatin,g aJtd pristine ltu~hs as ue embodied in the Veda. In other words, the impeccability and infallibility of the scripture inevitably point to a sQun:e or an author that cannot 'but be omniscient. Thus 7 Ood is ta be accepted on accuunt of 1he inviofabiliry of the word of 5cripture (and not lhe other way around, oamely, that •'revelation" is at:cepled because it is the word of God). From Kum.arila's point of view. an ornniscic:11t being would at bf;st be "" rtieiooym (for the Veda) and would at worst 1tot be very kind (in view of the magnitude of $&Jff erlng in the world), and is therefo:re not a desirable postuJatc.
The cruci~I point of thi: Mimirpsi argument is centered in thi.s discussion of authorship and espedally of •·omniscience~~· which we should here emphasize o. little more. After rejecting the Ny.a.ya evidence. whose basis is an inference positing a God ovel' and above the Veda, Kumarila ne:xt rejects an)' suggestion whatsoever of a being who is omniscient, on the grounds that ordinary humans. not themselves omniscient, would have no way of determining the omniscience of any being. KumarjJa's motives, however, go much deeper than simply expressing diffieulty of an epistemolo,gical kind. Clearly., his dispute is with the Ny~ya method~ il>c logician typkally first establishes the existence of God by means of inference (from ordinary experience) and then attributes the composition of the Veda to God. This is clearly not acceptable~ either from the logical OI" the cisrika point of view.
In the crudal l/okas (SV s# 114-t 16). Kumirila questions whether he would accept the evidence of the existence Qf the Creator Ood on the very assumption on which one is expected to ac(ept the omniscien~e of a (human) being (sar ... vajnamuvam) : .rarvajnavanni~edhya ca iira;rul) 
